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COMMERCIAL SPACE OPPOR'l'UNITIES FROM 'l'BE SOVIET UNION

William B. Wirin *
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
The Space Commerce Corporation
The Space Commerce Corporation and GLAVKOSMOS
began a joint venture on January 1, 1989.
This
agreement makes available to the entire world the vast
array of goods and services in the Soviet space
program.
Businessmen, corporations, and civil space
agencies now have access to the robust space capability
and infrastructure of the U.S.S.R.
This historic
development
in
the
commercial ization
of
space
activities is made even more dramatic by the commitment
to make these services and products available under the
terms and conditions specified by the buyer. We do it
your way.
The primary capabilities available are:
launch
service; communications satellites; remote sensing
information;
and
microgravity
opportunities
for
materials processing.
INTROOOC'lIOR

There is now the opportuni ty for pr ivate firms and
entrepreneurs to take part in the commercial space arena. Up to
now, the businessman has been stifled in his attempts to make the
space market prof itable due to government dominance of the field.
The opportunity now presents itself for the entrepreneur to forge
out into space limited only by the constraints of the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967.
The Joint Venture provides that SCC shall market all Soviet
space goods and services, including:
A.
Marketing launch and associated services for commercial
and scientific spacecraft including communications satellites;
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Springs and Webster University: Life Member, International
Institute of Space Law; Member, American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics; American Bar Association, Forum Committee on
Air and Space Law and Section on International Law and Practice.
Copyright @ 1989 by William B. Wirin; published by the American
Insti tute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Utah State
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B.
Marketing experimental and associated services in the
space environment, including man tended services on Soviet space
stations and the use of automatic systems;
C.
Marketing Soviet space hardware and component parts of
launch vehicles and spacecraft;
D.
Production of technical
space goods and services;

literature descr ibing Sov iet

E.
Production of advertising
Soviet space goods and services;

mater ial s

for

marketing

F.
Marketing Soviet space goods and services through trade
shows, conferences and scientific meetings;
G.
Obtaining the technical information and governmental
approvals required to market Soviet space goods and services;
H.
Marketing the services of Soviet communications, remote
sensing and navigation satellites;
1.
Marketing and
educational
activities
facilities1

conducting
technical
including
visi ts
to

tr ai ni ng
and
Sov iet
space

J.
Providing engineering and technical services including
the design and construction of space apparatus, spacecraft and
facilities;

K.

Conducting public relations activities.
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This listing is meant to be illustrative and not exhaustive.
We trust that innovative entrepreneurs will suggest new ways to
turn a profit from the resources of the Soviet space program.
What makes this opportuni ty truly unique is that pr ior to
now, every space program in the world has been instigated,
managed and controlled by a government.
The restr ictions and
labyrinth of procedures necessary to obtain space services have
had a chilling effect on the businessman. Therefore, it is truly
remarkable that it is through a social ist society that the free
enterprise businessman will have the first legitimate opportunity
to utilize space.
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SOVIET SPACE CAPABILITIES**

Few people in the world outside of military circles
appreciate the full capability of the Soviet space programs.
Sov iet space activities in recent years leave no doubt of the
vitality and commitment of the most prolific space program in the
world.
Less than four weeks after the celebration of the 30th
anniversary of the space age, the launch of Sputnik I on
Octobe r 4, 1957, the sov iet Union achieved its 2,0 OOth space
mission, compared with less than 1,000 for the rest of the world
combined.
In all, the Soy iets reached Earth orbi t 90 times in
1988 payloads while the United States and the rest of the world
could only muster 26 space 'flights.
Although the second lowest annual launch rate for the Soviet
Union in the 1980' s, the year's total was only 5% below the
decade's average and was caused pr imarily by temporary technical
problems within two programs.
Despite the recoveries and
expansions underway in the space programs of the Uni ted States
and the European Space Agency, the Soviet Union is likely to
retain her crown of the most active space-faring nation - a title
she has held for 22 years - into the foreseeable future.
In all,
the Soviet Union placed 108 new satellites into Earth orbit
during the year.
As must be expected with a space program of such magnitude,
setbacks are not uncommon, and in 1988 the sov iets exper ienced
more major failures than usual.
Within the first two months of
the year five Kosmos satellites were lost: three navigation
satellites to a launch failure of the SL-12 booster and two
photographic reconnaissance satellites which had to be destroyed
in separate incidents when they failed to respond to commands.
The greatest shock was the loss of the irreplaceable Phobos 1
spacecr aft due to a simple software error.
Meanwhile, the
ambitious program to explore Mars in the 1990's appeared to be in
disarray most of the time and ended the year with another
schedule delay and more modest near-term obj ectives.
Throughout the summer,
an uncontrolled nuclear-powered
spacecraft slowly fell to Earth, only to be saved in the eleventh
hour by a fortui tous series of events.
Equally alarming were
malfunctions on two successive manned spacecraft which resulted
in aborted reentries.
The first large scientific module for Mir
was again postponed,
and three different geophysical
and
astrophysical spacecraft failed to make promised launches.

** The author is indebted to Dr. Nicholas L. Johnson of Teledyne
Brown Engineering for his succinct summary of the Soviet space
program.
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The breakdown of mission types changed a little in 1988 but
this was due more to changes in the smaller programs as the
photographic reconnaissance,
communications,
and man-related
missions remained at 1987 levels. The high annual launch rate of
Soviet satellites continues to be a direct consequence of their
relatively short (by western standards) operational lifetimes.
By the end of the year 49% of the missions begun in 1988 had
already been terminated.
A second f actor behind the pr 01 ific Sov iet space launches is
the dependence of the Sov iet Union on the prol iferation of
modest, cheaper satellites in lieu of a smaller number of more
capable, expensive spacecraft. Standardization and manufacturing
ease also drive this philosophy of simpler is better.
As a
result,
Soviet
space
networks
degrade
gracefully
through
attrition, an attractive characteristic to both military and
civilian users.
Furthermore, failures can be overcome in short
order.
Six weeks after the SL-12 failure in February the launch
vehicle was returned to service.
Likewise, less than a month
elapsed between the loss of a military photographic satellite and
the launch of another in its class.
Sometimes hidden behind the raw statistics and the bel ief
that Soviet space systems are "old" and "unsophisticated" is the
tremendous modernization which has taken place in the 1980 IS.
Major new space systems have appeared in the Soviet program at a
rate of four per year during the decade.
Additionally,
improvements of reliability and capability have occurred in other
Soviet satellites.
The sheer magnitude and compl exi ty of the Sov iet space
program demands a tremendous support organization for the
planning, manufacture, launch, and operation of satellites from
dozens of individual proj ects.
For the past 20 years a new
Sov iet space mission has been started every four days on the
average.
During this same period that number of operational
satellites being maintained has grown from about 50 spacecraft to
150.
According to the U. S. Department of Defense, the Sov iet
Union now has at least 20 useable launch pads and could
reconstitute almost all of its satellite constellations in 2-3
months if the spacecraft were available.
The or iginal Sov iet space launch compl ex, responsible for
the launching of Sputnik 1, is located just east of the Aral Sea
in Kazakhstan, north of Afghanistan, and is usually referred to
as the Baikonur Cosmodrome or Tyuratam (the latter is an
historical reference to a nearby rail stop).
In 1988 Baikonur
conducted 43 space launches.
Baikonur is roughly analogous to the U. S. launch facil ities
at Cape Canaveral. All manned space flights originate from there
as do all geosynchronous, lunar, and planetaty craft.
It is the
4
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only facil ity capable of launching the Proton family of launch
vehicles (SL-12 and SL-13), the SL-16 medium-lift booster and the
new Energia (SL-17) heavy-lift/shuttle booster. All other Soviet
launch vehicles can be launched from there with the exception of
the small SL-8.
Two of the most impressive features of the Soviet space
program are its ability to conduct routine launches regardless of
weather conditions and to carry out launches in rapid succession.
The former was dramatically emphasized in March, 1988, when the
SL-3 carrying an Indian satellite lifted off a pad at Baikonur on
schedule in the midst of a driving snowstorm. Likewise, when the
Buran (Russian for snowstorm) space shuttle made its first voyage
in November the cloud ceil ing was down to a mere 410 m and the
winds were gusting to more than 70 km/hr.
The high winds which
buffeted Buran were attributed to an approaching cyclone.
On 18 occasions in 1988 two launchings were conducted within
24 hours, including two instances in which less than two hours
elapsed between flights.
In just over a 20-hour period dur ing
10-11 March the Soviet Union placed 10 satellites into orbit with
three launch vehicles (SL-4, SL-6, SL-8) using two launch
complexes (Plesetsk and Baikonur) •
With the successful launch of the Buran space shuttle, the
U.S.S.R. can now claim a launch vehicle arsenal of ten different
boosters with payload capacities ranging from 1700 kg to more
than 100,000 kg.
For the 12 years prior to 1988, these launch
vehicles placed an average 360 metr ic tons of payload (excluding
rocket bodies) into Earth orbit annually. As the Energia becomes
fully operational these figures may increase dramatically
although a maximum of 4-5 such flights - with and without Buran per year is likely through the mid-1990's.
Since 1979 the Soviets have concentrated on developing a
capable geostationary network, placing an average of six
satellites in this unique orbit 36,000 km above the equator each
year.
Another half dozen geosynchronous communications satellites
were launched in 1988 while four resident satellites were
abandoned or placed in storage locations to become inactive
standbys.
Two new slots in the geostationary ring were opened
up, bringing the Soviet total to 17, and individual systems were
expanded.
By the end of the year 26 satellites were being
maintained at operational locations, and four more were in
apparent inactive standby status.
Soviet geostationary communications satellites are currently
divided among four distinct programs: Raduga, Gorizont, Ekran,
and Kosmos.
Raduga and Gorizont satellites, which account for
the majority of Soviet operational geostationary spacecraft, are
5

general purpose communications satellites handling telephone,
television, and telegraph traffic for civilian, military, and
government subscriber.
Ekran satellites represent a unique
direct broadcast system for television programming, particularly
to the sparsely populated interior regions of the U.S.S.R.
Kosmos satellites are usually acknowledged as testbeds for new
communications equipment.
Dur ing 1988 the Gor izont and Ekran
systems received two new satellites each while only one Raduga
and one Kosmos spacecraft were launched.
Ekran,
debuted in 1976 as the world's first direct
television broadcast satellite.
Ekran is unique among all other
geostationary satellites in many ways.
First,
since its
transmissions are di rected pr imar ily at 40 percent of sov iet
territory in the sparsely populated regions of the extreme
northern and eastern portions of the U.S.S.R., the spacecraft can
transmit directly in the television band (0.7 GHz) without fear
of interference with other national television systems.
A
powerful
200-watt
transmitter
allows
the
construction of
relatively simple communal or even individual receivers.
Each
day 18 to 20 hours of color TV and radio programming are
broadcast.
A more capable, general purpose communications satellite
called Gorizont debuted in late 1978.
This versatile Soviet
communications
satellite
program
is
the
geosynchronous
counterpart to the Molniya 3 system.
A typical Gor izont now
carries eight transponders: six for 6/4 GHz, one for 14/11 GHz,
and one for 1.6/1.5 GHz Gorizont satellites have taken over the
majority
of
Intersputnik
(a
Soviet-led
international
communica tions network) traffic f rom the :r-lolniya 3 satellites.
A total
of
16
Gor izonts
have
now
been
placed
in
geosynchronous orbits and in general have demonstrated unusual
longevity by Soviet standards.
Gorizont 3, launched at the end
of 1979, was still being controlled at the end of 1988.
The civilian navigation satellite system is comprised of
only. four satellites, whose orbi tal planes are separated by 45
degrees of right ascension.
The matur ation dur ing the past decade of remote sensing
technology to evaluate the status of the Earth's natural
resources represents perhaps the greatest impact of space
exploration on the world's economy_
To profit from these new
technologies the Soviet Union has assembled the world's most
comprehensive network of diverse platforms and apparata to
provide remote sensing data. These data are collected by visible
and multi-spectral photography and infra-red, microwave, and
radar soundings.
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Resource-Ol, roughly analogous to the U. S. Landsat system,
relies on multi-spectral data digitally transmitted from sunsynchronous satellites.
LAUNCH SERVICES

Launch services include the Proton, Soyuz, Cyclone, Energia,
and in the future the START.
From a cost and timeliness
standpoint, launch of the first three rockets from Baikonur,
U. S. S. R. is preferred.
However, studies have been done which
indicate that these vehicles can be launched from numerous
locations around the world.
If an equatorial launch site is
chosen, the weight capability is increased by one-third.
For
example, the Proton which can place a 2,200kg payload into
geosynchronous orbi tal posi tion would be able to loft a 2,900kg
payload from an equatorial location. The START launcher is fully
transportable and the concept is to br ing the launch capabil i ty
to the satellite owner rather than having the satellite owner go
to the launcher.
This will enabl e the ope rator to sel ect the
most convenient launch location, taking into consideration weight
and orbi tal parameters, personnel costs, time constraints and
mission perspectives.
The Proton is an ideal vehicle to launch commercial
communications s.atellites because it can place even the heaviest
of them directly into final orbital position. The trend in that
industry is toward very heavy 8,000 to 11,000 pound satellites.
western launch vehicles can only deliver these satellites to an
intermediate orbit.
The satellite must use its own fuel or an
attached rocket engine to move to its final orbit.
This fact is
important because, if a satellite retains all its fuel, it can
operate for several years longer and earn $40 to $50 million more
in revenue.
In September, 1988, the U.S. granted export licenses for the
launch of three Hughes communications satellites from the Peoples
Republ ic of China.
Congress, however, blocked these exports
after the Tian'anmen Square tragedy. Nonetheless, SCC has signed
a Memorandum of Understanding with a corporation to launch a
Hughes communications satellite on the Proton.
The corporation
has already obtained the U.S. government license it required to
build and operate this satellite. It has agreed to be SCC's test
case for
a change in U. S. pol icy prohibi ting export of
communications satellites to the Soviet Union.
SCC plans to
apply for
the requi red export permits on behal f of the
corporation in 1989.
On July 29, 1989, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed
by the Space Commerce Corporation and Technoprebor to explore the
feasibility of building a derivative of the SS-20 called "START".
The three-stage, solid fuel launcher will be capable of carrying
a 300-lb. payload into an orbit of up to 500 km. (310 m!.).
7

• According to preliminary specifications, START will weigh 40-45
metric tons (88,400-99,450 lb.) and will have an overall length
of 20 meters (65.6 ft.), making it slightly larger than the twostage, 16.49 meter (54.1 ft.) SS-20.
As with the SS-20, the
START booster will be mounted on a transporter/launcher vehicle,
enabling it to be launched from a variety of sites without
special launching pads.
COMMUNICATIONS

This
market
consists
of
communications
transponders,
communications
satellites,
ground stations and special ized
turnkey communications and navigation systems.
A single transponder lease now costs $500,000 to $1,000,000
per year. Demand is expected to grow through the mid 1990's. By
1996, the number of transponders serving the U. S. is expected to
grow from 524 to 710. Average transponder sale price during 1987
was about $5.3 million. In recent Fee filings, AT&T estimated it
would pay $489 million for two satellites. Hughes has priced two
satellites at $422 million including launch.
Due to the age of cur rent satellites, virtually every e and
Ku band transponder now in use will be out of service by 1996.
The largest transponder increase is expected to come in pr ivate
networ ks, which will gr ow fran 94 today to 315 by the middl e of
the next decade.
The maj or segment of this market for see is the developing
nations who do not need, and cannot afford, expensive western
systems.
These countries also need assistance, which see will
provide, in working with international regulatory authorities.
Soviet communications satellites have historically been
highly elliptical Molniya satellites or geosynchronous Gorizonts
with eight transponders.
These have
served the
unique
communication requirements of the U.S.S.R. In order to serve the
world market with geosynchronous satellites, the Sov iets are
developing
a
new
satellite
called
"G LAV STAR "
with
21
transponders.
One half will be e band and the other half Ku
band.
The footprint of the Gorizont transponders has been quite
broad because of the vast territory covered.
The new satellites
will have a narrow beam to meet the needs of the developed and
developing nations.
In the long term, the company plans to build and launch
communications
satellite
systems
and
to
provide
turnkey
communications systems to end users, pr imarily in developing
nations.
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REMOTE SENSING

There are cur rently 17 non-U. S. Landsat and/or French Spot
Image remote sensing satellite systems.
Three additional
stations are under construction.
These stations have a combined
sunk cost of over $500 million.
Each station cur rently pays
$600,000 per year for its license to receive Landsat data.
This
fee, we understand, will increase to $800,000 per year in 1991.
Spot Image is even more expensive than Landsat.
The Landsat system may not be a dependable sour ce of this
da tao
It is expected that all of these stations and thei r
customers may soon have to rely exclusively on foreign sources
for current data for several years.
The company will seek to provide data to these stations at a
cost less than their current Landsat license.
For support of
those sales, the Sov iet government will guarantee a continuous
supply of data until the year 2000.
Remote sensing Soyuzkarta photographic images with Sm
resol ution has in the past been pr ov ided by the Space Commerce
Corpor ation.
This had 1 imited commerci al val ue because of the
restricted number of sensed areas available.
SCC no longer
handles these images but now markets remote sensing information
from Resource-Ol. This satellite provides near real time digital
data with 4Sm resolution.
Early in 1990 the resolution will be
reduced to 22.Sm.
In the 1991-2 time frame Sm resolution will be
available.
This remote sensing satellite is now available for a
cost of $lOOM, on orbit.
This not only includes the satellite
and launch costs, but the purchaser has the opportunity to tailor
the instrumentation of the satellite to serve his particular
needs.
The U.S.S.R. has guaranteed the availability of this remote
sensing data stream through the year 2000 and has given
assurances with regard to access and coverage that the United
Nations Principles on Remote Sensing will be followed.
In
addition to digital data, tapes will be available in a standard
format.
The Sov iet Union has an extensive capabil ity for val ue
added work.
Orders are being taken for studies tailored to a
particular requirement.
Addi tionally, the company has the abil ity to sell remote
sensing products, including unique data from the COSMOS 1870 type
radar observation satellite systems, which have no western
equivalent.
MATERIALS PROCESSIBG

AID SCI,BftIPIC RESEARCQ IN SPACE

Microgravity
experiments
and
materials
processing
opportuni ties exist both man-tended aboard the MIR space station
9

and on the Photon satellite.
This can be done in a routine
regimen under current Soviet procedures or specialized equipment
can be created and flown for unique requirements.
Several pr ivate companies in the U. S. and Europe have
contracted to fly unmanned experiments on the Sov iet ~lIR space
station.
NASA cur rently 1 ists a backlog on its waiting 1 ist of
over 600 such experiments.
The company expects to sell these
services primarily in Europe, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
SOVIET SPACE TOURS

GLAVKOSMOS contr 01 s acce ss to all space launch and flight
control facil ities in the Sov iet Union. Except for distinguished
visitors, no tours have been conducted in spi te of considerable
demand.
SCC tours are planned for 100 people each.
The groups will
travel from New York/Washington, D.C. to Moscow.
The first will
be this Fall.
These are handl ed by a subsi di ary of the Space
Commerce Corporation:
Aerospace Marketing Group, a Texas
Corporation, 4131 Spicewood Springs Road, Suite G-4, Austin,
Texas 78759, telephone (512) 338-4800.
Members of the tour will visit space vehicle processing
facilities, white rooms, cosmonaut training facilities, space
rockets and launch pads, in addition to Star City, Intercosmos
Headquarters, Space Research Institute, Soviet Mission Control,
and Russia's National Space Museum, pI us space memor ial sand
monuments in greater Moscow and Leningrad.
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